What level of involvement in abortion carries the canonical penalty of excommunication?

Q: I've heard that a Catholic who is involved in an abortion is automatically excommunicated. But where do you draw the line in terms of what makes a person involved? Like if a person drove a woman to the abortion clinic because he wanted to try to talk her out of it at the last minute, would he be excommunicated if the woman had an abortion after all? (Lakeland, FL)

A: It is true that abortion, besides being a grave sin, is also a canonical crime that carries the penalty you mention. However, like so many things in canon law, there are nuances that need to be taken into account.

Canon 1397, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Canon Law tells us that: "A person who actually procures an abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication."

For reference, "latae sententiae" is a Latin technical term which is usually translated as "automatic." When a crime has a latae sententiae excommunication attached as a penalty, this means that offenders are excommunicated by simply committing the crime, essentially excommunicating themselves by their own actions. This is as opposed to a "ferendae sententiae," or imposed penalty, which is meted out as the result of a canonical trial or similar judicial process.

Looking at the crime of abortion specifically, one meaningful phrase in the relevant canon is that the penalty applies to those "who actually procure an abortion." We can read "actually procure" as meaning: "directly and intentionally bringing about an abortion in a specific instance."

To illustrate, a doctor who performs an elective abortion is "actually procuring" one, as would a pregnant woman who seeks out an abortion for herself. In some circumstances, a person who was more peripherally involved might be "actually procuring an abortion" if they wanted the abortion to happen and somehow made it practically possible. For example, if a man coerced his pregnant girlfriend into having an abortion, arranged for her transportation to the clinic, and paid for it himself, he could be understood as actually procuring the abortion in question.

But there are other ways of being involved with or supporting abortion which, while gravely immoral, would not be considered as "actually procuring" an abortion and therefore would not qualify for the automatic excommunication. For instance, a pro-choice politician's support of pro-abortion policy is not the same thing as bringing about an abortion in real life. (Although, depending on the specifics of the situation, this kind of support for abortion might have other canonical consequences -- e.g., they might be prohibited from receiving holy Communion as per canon 915, a situation which is different from excommunication.)

Additionally, there are some scenarios where even a person who did directly procure an abortion in the way that Canon 1397, Paragraph 2 envisions would, nevertheless, not incur the stated penalty. In particular, Canon 1323 tells us that "no one is liable to a penalty" if, among other things: they are under the age of 16; they are committing the act as a result of force or fear; or if, through no fault of their own, they were unaware of the penalty attached to the crime they were committing.

In the situation you describe, it seems very unlikely to me that a person who drove a woman to her abortion appointment in the hope that it would give him an opportunity to dissuade her would be committing the crime of direct procurement of an abortion since his intention was directly the opposite. While the prudence of his course of action might be debated, a person does not incur the penalty for a crime they did not commit, so therefore the driver would not be excommunicated.
If a Catholic has concerns about whether his involvement in an abortion has made him excommunicated, the best thing for him to do is talk to a priest in real life. A priest would be able to assess the person's situation, offer them the sacrament of penance, and if necessary, resolve the excommunication.